liberalism seemed outdated to many in Western and Central Europe as well as in the United States. Indeed, in his interpretation of twentieth-century European history, Mark
Mazower has argued that the idea of liberal democracy "was virtually extinct" by the late 1930s.
2 Given the renaissance of liberal democracy an exploration of postwar European history in light of larger questions about the inherently fragile nature of democracy as a way of life is a task for scholars interested in the future of representative government, the rule of law, and of the idea of a liberal polity. 3 And yet, a noticeable hesitation is discernible among historians in addressing larger questions about the contingent nature of democracy. My aim is to encourage more studies that explicitly explore the contingency and fragility of representative government and the rule of law.
Given the somewhat elusive nature of such large questions, the arguments advanced in this essay are best understood as tentative, even speculative, but hopefully as suggestive. As an attempt to foster a genuinely historical understanding of liberal democracy the following reflections freely draw on recent scholarship on postwar
Germany.
Against the backdrop of recent interpretations of the interwar and war years that emphasize how widespread the disenchantment with representative government and the rule of law was all over Western Europe (as well as in the United States), this essay draws on the concept of "moral history" to shed new light on postwar German history.
Key questions include: How did concepts of civility, morality and manners, of trust and civic virtue foster or threaten the "unsocial sociability" of citizens (Immanuel Kant)?
How were bonds of belonging imagined and formed and what role did they play in producing a sense of the self? When and why were these bonds torn? How did moral dramas, conflicts over manners, and controversies over ethics-in the wake of genocide and total war-shape the larger story of a fledgling democracy that was the Federal Republic?
Democratic Passions and Nazi Morality
To invoke the concept of moral history is not to suggest that we would do well to write the history of postwar Germany from the vantage point of contemporary morality. Nor should moral history, as Michael Geyer and John Boyer have pointed out, be "mistaken for either a judgmental and incriminating or a melodramatic history."
Instead, the concept directs our attention to how central conceptions of morality, moral passions, and moral practices were to the search for democracy in the shadow of manmade mass death. "Above all," Geyer and Boyer note, "moral history engages in a debate on violence. It finds its supreme challenge in an age that is marked by genocidal confrontations." If moral history sheds light on how "institutions, groups of people, and individuals … renew the social bonds that constitute communities and nations and the integrity of their 'body politic'," such an endeavor is indispensable to the analysis of postwar German history and perhaps postwar European history generally.
Languages of morality invoke the juxtaposition of good and evil, the distinction between right and wrong, and the difference between vice and virtue. Yet are such binary oppositions primarily based on reason, as Habermasian proponents of a discourse theory of ethics seem to imply? In his inaugural lecture of 1965, "Knowledge and Human Interest," postwar Germany's most influential political philosopher called for a rational basis for collective life which could only be achieved when "social relations were organized 'according to the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free of domination.'" In both substance and style such arguments raise the question whether fantasies of the "forceless force of the better argument" are perhaps best understood as a form of magical thinking embedded in the austere rationality that was characteristic of postwar German political theory. 6 Particularly to foreign commentators, Habermas seemed like "a rationalistic utopian who measures the crooked timber of humanity against standards gained by viewing it sub specie emancipationis." 7 Discourse ethics, it seems, evaded the question of moral incommensurability through an attempt to make passion the slave of reason. This school of moral philosophy is perhaps best understood against the background of post-Fascist sensitivities that responded to a specific (historical and, therefore, contingent) understanding of Nazism as the triumph of passions over reason. 8 Passions, ethical distinctions were "natural," others were "artificial." The latter, like justice, fidelity, modesty, and good manners, were artificial in the sense that they grow out of the quotidian encounters among citizens, be they impersonal, harmonious, or contentious. Yet, if artificial virtues are "entirely artificial, and of human invention" (338), such moral sentiments are simultaneously a prerequisite for, and a result of, the quotidian encounters and conflicts between citizens, practices Immanuel Kant would soon label the unsocial sociability of citizens. The "artifice" of moral sentiments that grow out of civic sociability gives rise to a form of "restraint" that is not "contrary to the passions," but "only contrary to their heedless and impetuous movement." Artifical virtues such as justice and good manners therefore cannot transcend the natural "partiality of our affections," but allow citizens to develop the elementary skills of restraining and checking selfishness and resentment (314).
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Even if Kant rather than Hume served as the guiding light of postwar German moral philosophy, the Scottish philosopher's reflections on moral sentiments are helpful for our understanding of a democratic polity in the shadow of violence.
11 For, if Hume is right, insights into the emotional basis of morality and the passions that inform conceptions of justice and equality are critical to any analysis of the fragile nature of liberal democracy. Such ruminations may seem superfluous to those who view democracy as a formal system of governance. They seem indispensable, however, if one subscribes to a pragmatist conception of "Democracy as a Way of Life" or a thick constitutionalism informed by a "Liberalism of Fear." As Judith Shklar put it, this is a nonutopian liberalism that abandons the idea of "a summum bonum" toward which everyone should strive, and instead begins "with a summum malum," namely "cruelty Virtue, For the three decades between 1960 and 1990, the "Philosopher's Index" lists a total of 445 German-language essays on ethics; among these scholarly publications 93 invoke Immanuel Kant whereas only 4 invoke David Hume. For the following two decades, the same index lists 1458 Germanlanguage essays on ethics out of which 240 refer to Kant and only 9 to Hume. A look at essays published in English also suggests a preponderance of Kant; the ration, however, is far less striking: 919 to 353 for the period between 1960 and 1990, and 1499 to 513 since 1991. World Cat lists exactly one Germanlanguage publication on "David Hume" and "Ethics" as subject headings published between 1950 and 1980, as during the interwar years, the pragmatist philosopher argued that democracy needed to be based on "an affirmation of certain attitudes" that were "more important than any particular set of institutions": the belief in the "intrinsic … dignity" of every individual, the belief "in the value of difference, variety and uniqueness," and a "faith in some method" by which conflicts between irreconcilable and incommensurable moral passions can be hedged in and regulated. (Chicago, 1998), pp. 3-20, quotation pp. 10-11; eadem, "Putting Cruelty First," in Daedalus 111 (1982) Before the Last" Kracauer argued that an adequate study of the historian's world "calls for the efforts of a self as rich in facets as the affairs reviewed." 16 If he is right we need to carefully draw on our own fantasies and fears, desires and demons that emerge out of the moral dramas and moral incommensurabilities of our present rather than putting them aside when we write the history of moral passions in postwar Germany.
To study the entanglement of democracy and intimacy in postwar Germany from the vantage point of moral history seems particularly compelling in light of the fact that historians have begun to reject interpretations of Nazism (as well as fascism and renunciation or sacrifice of prior allegiances to family or region, religion or estates; on the other hand, human and civil rights allow for, and encourage, expressions of "democratic individuality" (George Kateb) that give rise to an intricate structure of difference within which cultural tensions, political enmities and economic conflicts can be negotiated.
22 Indeed, the challenge for any democratic polity lies in the ability of its citizens to construct a public space that both encourages the "unsocial sociability" of citizens and recognizes their right to be different.
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If some of the following arguments are relevant for a more general understanding of liberal democracy, there are also elements to the story that are peculiar to postwar Germany that he recalls as an "incredible, almost comical, melting-pot of peoples and nationalities sizzling dangerously in the very heart of Europe." Like other survivors, Borowski "did not know where to turn" and found himself under the command and protection of "young American boys, equally stupefied and equally shocked at what they had found in Europe." They had come like the crusaders to conquer and convert the European continent, and after they had finally settled in the occupation zones, they proceeded with dead seriousness to teach the distrustful, obstinate German bourgeoisie the democratic game of baseball and to instill in them the principles of profit-making by exchanging cigarettes, chewing gum, contraceptives and chocolate bars for cameras, gold teeth, watches and women. The four of us became involved in a heated discussion with the poet, his silent wife and his mistress (the philologist), by maintaining that in this war morality, national solidarity, patriotism and the ideals of freedom, justice and human dignity had all slid off man like a rotten rag. We said that there is no crime that a man will not commit in order to save himself. And, having saved himself, he will commit crimes for increasingly trivial reasons; he will commit them first out of duty, then from habit, and finally -for pleasure.
We told them with much relish all about our difficult, patient, concentration-camp existence which had taught us that the whole world is really like the concentration camp; the weak work for the strong, and if they have no strength or will to workthen let them steal, or let them die.
The world is ruled by neither justice nor morality; crime is not punished nor virtue rewarded, one is forgotten as quickly as the other. The world is ruled by power and power is obtained with money. To work is senseless, because money cannot be obtained through work but through exploitation of others. And if we cannot exploit as much as we wish, at least let us work as little as we can. Moral duty? We believe neither in the morality of man, nor in the morality of systems. In German cities the store windows are filled with books and religious objects, but the smoke from the crematoria still hovers above the forests.
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Another commentator who believed that the cataclysmic violence of the mid twentieth century constituted a rupture in the history of morality and was best understood historically was Hannah Arendt. In a public lecture of February 1965, she based her reflections on moral philosophy on the insight that both Nazism and Stalinism had called into question the seemingly self-evident distinctions between right and wrong.
29 Such certainties, she noted had collapsed almost overnight, and then it was as though morality suddenly stood revealed in the original meaning of the word, as a set of mores, customs and manners, which could be exchanged for another set with hardly more trouble than it would take to change the table manners of an individual or a people. (740) Yet if Stalinist Russia was a case in point, "German developments" were "much more extreme and perhaps also more revealing," Arendt argued: "There is not only the gruesome fact of elaborately established death factories and the utter absence of hypocrisy" among those "involved in the extermination program. Equally important, but perhaps more frightening, was the matter of-course collaboration from all strata of 'moral' order," Arendt argued, and the "sudden return to 'normality,' contrary to what is often complacently assumed, can only reinforce our doubts." (744-745). Postwar Germans needed to face their complicity in "real evil," in "sadism, the sheer pleasure in causing and contemplating pain and suffering." This "vice of all vices" needed to be distinguished from "radical evil" which "comes from the depths of despair" and is embodied by Lucifer "the light-bearer, a Fallen Angel." To confront the historical realm of "real evil" as opposed to the literary and philosophical realm of "radical evil," she concluded, leads to "speechless horror, when all you can say is: This should never have Foreign observers, therefore, were surprised that they could no longer distinguish Germans in the restaurants of European capitals from other continental Europeans at first glance . . . as they now looked like everyone else, though perhaps they could be recognized at a second glance, since they wanted to be even more unremarkable than the others. 33 Small wonder than that critics of the European Union would quip that the label European was no more than a "euphemism for Germans traveling abroad." 34 Well-dressed, well-fed people crowd the sidewalks, fill the streamlined subways and spacious streetcars … The homes of the rich are decorated with bearded Chagall Rabbis, on canvas or on paper. Formidable old knights' castles, where the Nazis once trained specially selected youths … 'to look at a thousand corpses without batting an eyelash' (Himmler) today flourish as whimsical hotels for romantically inclined tourists. Nearby international student centers conduct symposiums on 'French-German understanding' or for 'Christian-Jewish cooperation'. The twelve years of Nazi rule had tainted every aspect of German life and culture. No matter how many citizens were now claiming to be dyed-in-the-wool "democrats," any attempt to construct a better polity would fail unless they realized that they were in fact absolute beginners and would have to "learn to spell out the word democracy from can never again fully trust his nation; he cannot trust democracy any more than any other system of government; he can never again fully trust humanity, and least of all that which optimists used to call the 'meaning of history'. He will remain, regardless of how hard he may and should try, sad to the depths of his soul until he dies. the Catholic laicization movement, argued that many Christians continued to support an ideal of the family that was "modeled on bygone conceptions of the state, in which citizens were governed from above and thus sentenced to enforced inactivity." In the January issue of the Catholic monthly Frau und Mutter, which then boasted more than half a million subscribers, Borgmann emphasized that for children to learn to "experience freedom and to live by" this ideal early on, the family should not take its cues from the ideal of "absolute monarchy" or, worse, "dictatorship." Whoever defended patriarchal-authoritarian forms of child-rearing pretended not to know that those responsible for Nazi crimes had come from "'orderly' families and not from the margins of society." Fathers who had raised their children with "authoritarian [...] and violent methods" had been the midwives of the Nazi dictatorship. Those who kept treating their children "wrongfully" had to be aware that these children would themselves "turn into oppressors" as adults Borgmann cautioned: "Some henchmen of the concentration camps came evidently from so-called 'orderly' families'".
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Throughout the postwar period the struggle over how best to inculcate and practice the moral sentiments that would allow mature citizens to serve as guardians of a democratic future gave rise to numerous cultural , educational, and scholarly institutions. These ranged from the "Max-Planck Institut für Bildungsforschung,"
especially under the directorship of two Jewish rémigrés Saul B. Robinson (1916 Robinson ( -1972 and Wolfgang Edelstein (born in 1929) as well as Dietrich Goldschmidt (1914 Goldschmidt ( -1998 Kracauer articulated similar sentiments as Plessner.
We were in Germany only for three days: two in Hamburg and one in Freiburg, where we visited old Bernhard Guttman. We'd had enough after that. The attendant in the Hamburg hotel must certainly have been a keen SA man, but it's best not to ask. Other than that, everyone was quite civil to us, the young are curious (and know nothing); there is some really good material here. We shudder at the thought of staying there," Kracauer noted on October 27, 1956, in a letter to his close friend and fellow émigré Leo Löwenthal, "for another reason: It seems strikingly clear that there has never been a society in Germany. People live without form or focus; they lack shape (and are disordered within). Everything is there, but nothing is in its proper place. So they behave in ways that are insincere and overly artificial, use stilted language, and are completely insecure. They are not so much human beings as raw material for human beings. In short, I don't trust them.
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A lack of form (and of "politesse") and an impermeability of moral boundaries also marked daily life in the Federal Republic. The few scholars, such as Friedrich
Tenbruck, who have explored quotidian encounters between postwar Germans, have pointed to the "remarkable insecurities and irritations" that shaped the public sphere.
Postwar (West) Germans tended to mingle with those who shared their morality and their politics and refused to socialize with those whose politics they might hate and whose morality they might look down on or even despise. Random encounters with strangers rarely gave rise to genuine curiosity and instead led to the exchange of embarrassed platitudes. "People seek homogeneity and are highly selective in their associations, and display marked signs of idiosyncracy," Tenbruck noted in 1974. Whenever Galtung interacted with colleagues from German universities and research institutes, he was surprised by the pervasiveness of a peculiar intellectual style that he labeled "'teutonic thinking' […] , not so much because of its form as because of its seriousness, the relentless energy, the zeal with which this type of activity is and audience." Hence the lack of curiosity and the inability to create a "relaxed and friendly atmosphere." Among adherents of the Teutonic intellectual style scholarly conversations were therefore "a series of monologues rather than a real dialogue […] It is as if each participant is seated on the top of his system, clinging to his little (or big)
alp," declaring in an "unusually high-pitched voice" that "his alp is the only one."
III. Clumsy Encounters-Moral Obsessions
One need not accept every turn of Tenbruck's or Galtung's arguments to realize that postwar Germans were not exactly masters of a playful politesse. Few and far between were those who practiced Henri Bergson's insight that a politesse des manières and a politesse de l'esprit drew on a republican love of equality and "an intellectual subtlety"
(une souplesse intellectuelle) that enables citizens to live with enmity and aversion and to cultivate forms of sociability that allow them to grasp what they cannot embrace.
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The ability to converse with strangers, the capability to talk to one's adversaries, the capacity to regulate conflict, aversion and even enmity, the faculty to acknowledge and navigate political passions and moral incommensurability; such elementary skills of public life in a liberal democracy were (and perhaps are) anything but the forte of postwar Germans who preferred utopian dreams of moral harmony over an acceptance of moral diversity as the inevitable effect of individual freedom.
As a concept that is less an analytical category than a shorthand to draw our attention to a complex set of questions, "moral history" allows us to understand why the divide between the realm of politics and the private sphere has been more than usually unstable and contested in periods of revolutionary upheaval and dramatic political change like postwar European and particularly postwar German history. Utopias and obsessions, fantasies and fears about the political ramifications of private life have been central to how postwar Germans imagined themselves as citizens of a democratic polity.
Over the course of the postwar decades the basic premise predominated: The basis of the political, the beginning and the end of politics, was neither enmity or competition, nor the idea of peace or of the common weal, but rather the private realm. Against this background one can begin to make sense of the peculiar simultaneity of obsessive exchanges over how best to establish democracy as a way of life and the clumsiness that postwar Germans displayed in these very controversies. These obsessions therefore perpetuated the clumsiness in encounters between citizens-experiences that in turn fueled their fears and anxieties.
It is therefore hardly surprising that some of the best studies on the second half of the twentieth century (no matter how diverse the subject matter under review may seem at first) have all explored the nexus between democracy and intimacy and have thereby provided the groundwork for a history of moral passions in postwar Germany:
Debates about gender relations and the family, child-rearing and paternal authority, controversies over sexuality and abortion, heteronormativity and the rights of gays and lesbians, disputes about consumer culture and Germany's place within the world at large, debates over the meaning of victimhood and trauma, quarrels over the memory of Nazism and the Holocaust, controversies over immigration and national identity, as well as arguments over the role of religion and diversity in the public sphere-these obsessions essentially revolved around the idea that the fate of postwar German democracy depended on specific private practices and moralities. 
